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The transformation of the South African publicsector, the criminal justice system, andspecifically the police, is critical to the
consolidation of democracy in the country. Good
governance demands that a sound judicial system
operates in an environment where services are
delivered in a manner that is transparent,
accountable and responsive to citizen’s needs,
while at the same time ensuring equal treatment
and attention. To this end, the bodies responsible
for civilian oversight of the police have an
important contribution to make.   
In an effort to promote transformation and
strengthen democracy, the Open Society
Foundation South Africa (OSF SA) and the Open
Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) initiated a study into
civilian oversight of policing in South Africa during
2003. The aim of the project was to find ways to
strengthen civilian oversight. A lengthy consultation
process resulted in five focus areas of police
oversight being identified for research and
evaluation:
• oversight of municipal policing; 
• the role of community police forums (CPFs) in 
civilian oversight; 
• developing a set of indicators for democratic 
policing; 
• establishing a website focusing on police 
oversight issues; and 
• evaluating the secretariats for safety and security
at both national and provincial levels.1
Mechanisms for police oversight 
In the early 1990s, the role of the police in a
democratic South Africa was debated and
reconstructed. A number of innovations were
introduced to contribute to police transformation in
the country. These included the formation of one
South African Police Service (SAPS) from the 11
previously existing police agencies, and the
establishment of mechanisms for civilian oversight
of the police. 
The three primary mechanisms of civilian oversight
are community police forums at local level,
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Civilian oversight bodies such as the secretariats for safety and security and the ICD have been vocal about
recent incidents of police misconduct and abuse of power. However, it is not enough to merely record and
comment on such incidents. If real transformation of the SAPS and improvements in service delivery are to
occur, civilian oversight should be given greater value and support by political and administrative leaders. This
article presents the findings of a recent evaluation aimed at identifying ways to strengthen the secretariats’
role in police oversight.
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secretariats for safety and security at provincial and
national levels, and the Independent Complaints
Directorate (ICD) which also operates at provincial
and national levels. All of these mechanisms are
provided for in relevant pieces of legislation and/or
the Constitution.  
In addition to the provision of civilian oversight at
local, provincial and national level, the legislation
allows for oversight over policy, strategy and
operations. The legislative provisions relating to
CPFs permit them to encourage members of the
public to work with the police to ensure improved
relationships and trust between the police and the
community. Similarly, the ICD was established as an
independent body that would investigate cases of
abuse of force and misconduct in relation to the
public, and make policy recommendations in this
regard. The role of the secretariats has been more
focused on monitoring the SAPS and conducting
oversight at the policy and strategic levels.  
How necessary is civilian oversight?
In the tenth year of our democracy, it is apparent
that civilian oversight is as necessary as ever. Recent
high profile incidents of deaths resulting from police
action include those of 17 year old Teboho
Mkhonza in Harrismith,2 and Optel Rooi in the
Northern Cape.3 The problem of police corruption
was also recently highlighted on television in
SABC’s Special Assignment, which exposed
Johannesburg SAPS officers taking bribes from sex
workers and their clients.4
According to the ICD statistics for 2003/04,
recorded cases of deaths in police custody or as a
result of police action increased by 35% when
compared to the same period in 2002/03.5 In
addition, there was a 47% increase in reports of
serious criminal offences allegedly committed by
SAPS members. Incidents of misconduct reported to
the ICD also increased by 28% compared to the
same period in 2002/03.6
The high profile cases noted above, as well as the
many civil claims for damages awarded against the
SAPS and increasing deaths in custody, highlight the
importance of effective civilian oversight over the
SAPS and the various municipal police departments.
The question that needs to be posed is: has the
SAPS transformed itself adequately and, by
implication, has civilian oversight succeeded in its
mandate to transform the SAPS?
A recent ISS evaluation of the national and
provincial secretariats for safety and security
indicates that these civilian oversight mechanisms
have had, at best, mixed success and have made a
limited contribution to police transformation. The
findings of this research are presented below.
However, in order to understand the issues, it is
necessary to consider the changing context within
which oversight has taken place. 
The rationale behind establishing civilian oversight
institutions was primarily to ensure that the police
would never again be a law unto themselves as
they were prior to 1994. Oversight structures
would hold the police accountable for their
actions, among other things, and instill good
practices within the service generally. Initially, as
far as the secretariats were concerned, civilian
oversight centred on the appointment of civilians
rather than people from the security apparatus.
Many of the people staffing the secretariats had
histories in non-governmental and community
based organisations, which influenced the nature
of the secretariats and how they went about their
business.
The first national secretary for safety and security
was appointed in 1995, and the national and
provincial secretariats were established thereafter.
The Constitution directs that a civilian secretariat
for the police must be established under the
cabinet member responsible for policing.7
The mandate of the secretariats is spelt out in the
South African Police Services Act 68 of 1995 (‘the
SAPS Act’).8 This includes advising the minister for
safety and security in the exercise of his powers,
and promoting democratic accountability and
transparency in the police service. The secretariats
were to ensure police compliance with
transformation, and to do this they needed to
overcome resistance from senior and lower ranking
police members to change, and place
transformation at the centre of the police service.
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Essentially the task was to transform the police from
a security force to a legitimate public-oriented
police service. As a result, expectations about the
secretariats’ role and impact on the police were
high. These expectations were tempered by the
realisation that transforming the SAPS was to be a
long term project. Indeed, there was an assumption
that civilian oversight would always be high on the
agenda of the SAPS, the minister for safety and
security, and the relevant provincial members of the
executive council (MECs).
Changing shape of the national secretariat
The context within which civilian oversight bodies
were established shaped their structure. The
secretary for safety and security and the executive
director of the ICD report to the minister for safety
and security, as does the national commissioner of
the SAPS. Therefore, the minister deals with diverse
but competing interests, which has often resulted in
the national secretariat being sidelined. 
A major difference between the oversight bodies
lies in the financial autonomy of the national
secretariat and the ICD. Although both structures
report to the minister, they are significantly different
in terms of who controls the purse strings. The
national commissioner of police is the accounting
officer for the secretariat as stated in both the
Public Service Act and the Public Finance
Management Act.9 By contrast, the executive
director of the ICD is the accounting officer for that
organisation, giving it greater independence. The
ICD is therefore believed to have, and indeed does
have, a greater degree of autonomy and impact in
the execution of its functions than the secretariat.
The functions of the national secretariat are listed in
s3(1) and s3(2) of the SAPS Act. In the first five
years of the national secretariat’s existence, it
played a prominent role in formulating policy and
overseeing its implementation. The national
secretariat was then well staffed, equally well
resourced and politically supported. Moreover,
regular meetings took place between the leadership
at the time: the minister for safety and security,
Sydney Mufamadi, the national police
commissioner, George Fivaz and Azhar Cachalia,
the secretary for safety and security. 
Civilian oversight could be said to have taken its
rightful place in shaping safety and security issues. It
was during this period that important policy
documents such as the National Crime Prevention
Strategy (NCPS) and the White Paper on Safety and
Security were developed and adopted.  
This state of affairs was dramatically overturned after
the national elections in 1999 when a new minister
for safety and security, Steve Tshwete, was
appointed. A few months later, Azhar Cachalia
vacated his post and slowly but surely the capacity
and influence of the national secretariat diminished.
The reduced status was reflected in the downgrading
of the national secretary’s post from director general
to deputy director general. Moreover, the
secretariat’s role in respect of formulating policing
policy was substantially weakened. 
Other important developments included naming the
SAPS national commissioner as the secretariat’s
accounting officer, thereby effectively placing the
secretariat in a subservient position. The social
crime prevention capacity of the secretariat was also
taken away and placed under the auspices of the
SAPS. 
Structure of the provincial secretariats
In contrast to the national secretariat, the provincial
secretariats are autonomous bodies answerable to
the provincial executive and independent of the
national secretariat. Some of the provincial
structures are well funded, with budgets and staff
complements varying from one province to another.
The Western Cape Department of Community Safety,
for example, has a budget of R151,436,000 for
2004/05, while the Northern Cape’s budget is
R11,997,000.10
Although the White Paper for Safety and Security
has had a great deal of influence over their structure
– in particular by suggesting the establishment of
directorates dedicated to social crime prevention –
each of the provincial secretariats has a different
configuration. They nevertheless broadly carry out
the same type of work, including policy monitoring,
responding to service delivery complaints, and
conducting crime awareness campaigns in their
provinces.
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While a hierarchy is evident between the SAPS and
the secretariat at national level, the same does not
apply at provincial level. Relationships vary widely
at provincial level and the unevenness in how the
provincial secretariats are structured is also
apparent in their relationship with the SAPS. 
In Gauteng, for example, the secretariat has
entrenched a system of quarterly reviews with the
SAPS. These review sessions are organised by the
provincial secretariat and attended by its senior
managers, the MEC, the SAPS provincial and area
commissioners as well as the regional director of
the ICD. The reviews take place over two days
during which SAPS’ progress is measured against
set objectives. Practices such as these seem to be
dependent on the personalities of the MECs, and
the relationships that exist or are developed
between MECs and SAPS provincial leadership. 
In contrast to the Gauteng example, the Northern
Cape secretariat only recently managed to have the
SAPS accompany them when they reported to the
provincial legislature. The Constitution requires the
SAPS to report annually to the provincial
legislature on policing in the province.11
How have the secretariat’s fared?
The evaluation of the secretariats was conducted
over a five-month period during 2004. The
research was qualitative in nature, using face-to-
face interviews and focus group discussions with
individuals in the provincial secretariats. Those in
the secretariats’ monitoring and evaluation
directorates were singled out for interviews
because theirs is the core business of the
secretariat. 
In sum, 32 individuals were interviewed and four
focus groups with a total of 15 individuals per
group, were conducted. Unfortunately a request to
interview SAPS provincial commissioners was
turned down, as were repeated requests to
interview the national secretary and his staff. The
reluctance of the SAPS and national secretary to
contribute to the study, although unfortunate,
largely confirms what the available respondents
indicated with regard to problems of transparency
and inclusiveness on the part of SAPS. 
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In short, the evaluation highlighted the divergent
experiences of civilian oversight, and the rapidity
of change in what constitutes civilian oversight of
the police. The research found that despite the
legislative requirements and policy frameworks,
the outputs of these agencies vary from location to
location. Nevertheless, respondents from each of
the secretariats felt that they played a key role in
monitoring police service delivery and
transformation, as well as issues of representivity,
resource allocation, and performance. 
Apart from their monitoring activities, the
provincial secretariats also coordinated various
crime prevention meetings and projects at
provincial and, in some cases, local level.
However, the research found that these practices
were largely uneven and dependent on the
personalities of the MECs and the heads of the
departments involved. 
All the secretariats appear to suffer from a lack of
national coordination and vision. The
relationships between the national and provincial
secretariats, between the secretariats in each
province, and with the SAPS and ICD, remain
unstructured. Furthermore, the lack of secretariat
influence at police station level was a particular
concern to the respondents. The difficulties
experienced by provincial secretariats in trying to
exert influence over police counterparts in their
province who take direction and orders from their
national leadership, should not be
underestimated. 
In sum, the evaluation concluded that the
secretariats have functioned less as civilian
oversight mechanisms than as structures providing
ad hoc monitoring of various aspects of policing,
policy advice, and coordination for crime
prevention projects. This was tacitly
acknowledged by the respondents, who clearly
indicated that the current policing priorities and
context should form the backdrop to a strategic
review of the secretariat’s raison d’etre, as well as
a possible realignment of the secretariats’ role and
function. This process would also allow for the
position and powers of the national secretary to
be assessed and amended if necessary.
collaboration between the secretariats as far as the
sharing of good practice is concerned.     
Formalising of processes to ensure good working
relations
There is currently a reliance on personal goodwill
and interpersonal relationships for the creation of
good working relationships between each of the
secretariats, and between the secretariats and the
ICD and SAPS in the provinces. Structures need to
be set in place to formalise and guarantee that
cooperation occurs. 
Contribute to policy and legislative review
processes
While the secretariats have, to varying degrees,
implemented the provisions in the White Paper and
NCPS, the time is right to revisit the understanding
of the term ‘civilian oversight’ in relation to the
secretariats and their work.
A future for the secretariats?
Considering that relationships between the police
and the communities they serve have improved
since 1994, and that the SAPS has undergone
significant transformation, the question is whether
there remains a need for civilian oversight in the
form of the secretariats. While the issue is
debatable, the fact is that although the political
environment has changed substantially since 1994,
the policing and social environments still demand
that clear and effective mechanisms for police
oversight are in place. 
The real and perceived high levels of crime in
South Africa result in a great deal of pressure on the
police to perform. The proliferation of firearms and
the high levels of violent crime exacerbate the
situation, adding to the risk of police misconduct or
improper use of force. This may be one explanation
for the increase in the recorded number of cases of
police misconduct. The trend may also be
attributed to improved knowledge among the
public of their rights in this regard. What is certain
is the need for more effective oversight processes to
ensure that such incidents are reduced, and that
transformation of the SAPS is assisted through
amendments to policy and practice where
necessary. 
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Recommendations
The study’s recommendations relate to both the role
and functioning of the secretariats at national and
provincial levels. These include the following: 
Existing provisions in legislation must be exploited
Currently, the secretariats are not using the
opportunities provided for in legislation to place
civilian oversight firmly on the SAPS’ agenda. A
process should be undertaken as soon as possible to
identify gaps in existing practice, so as to give
direction to the legislative review process.
The current role, function and structure of the
secretariats should be revisited
The policing priorities and context should inform a
strategic process which would include a
reassessment of the secretariat’s raison d’etre, as
well as a possible realignment of the secretariats’
role and function. This process should also allow for
the position and powers of the national secretary to
be assessed and amended if necessary.
Sharpening the national secretariat’s role
The national secretariat should remain a small but
effective policy advice think tank for the minister of
safety and security and for the provincial
secretariats. The national secretariat needs to regain
its former strategic role in policy advice to the
minister. 
The same training on policy analysis and
implementation is needed for all secretariats
It is apparent that the capacity for policy analysis,
monitoring and evaluation is severely lacking in
some secretariats. In addition, the interpretation of
these roles varies in some instances.  
Collaborative planning and strategising between the
secretariats and with the ICD 
The national and provincial secretariats should have
collaborative strategic planning sessions which
include the ICD when appropriate. This will assist
to create a common understanding of needs and
priorities, and to ensure uniformity in approach
where necessary and appropriate.  
Sharing of good practice between the secretariats
Currently there is little formal or structured
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